Abstract. Anonymity is a security property of paramount importance, as we move steadily towards a wired, online community. Its import touches upon subjects as different as eGovernance, eBusiness and eLeisure, as well as personal freedom of speech in authoritarian societies. Trust metrics are used in anonymity networks to support and enhance reliability in the absence of verifiable identities, and a variety of security attacks currently focus on degrading a user's trustworthiness in the eyes of the other users. In this paper, we analyse the privacy guarantees of the Crowds anonymity protocol, with and without onion forwarding, for standard and adaptive attacks against the trust level of honest users.
Introduction
Protecting online privacy is an essential part of today's society and its importance is increasingly recognised as crucial in many fields of computer-aided human activity, such as eVoting, eAuctions, bill payments, online betting and electronic communication. One of the most common mechanisms for privacy is anonymity, which generally refers to the condition of being unidentifiable within a given set of subjects, known as the anonymity set.
Many schemes have been proposed to enforce privacy through anonymity networks (e.g. [6, 15, 19, 24, 25] ). Yet, the open nature of such networks and the unaccountability which results from the very idea of anonymity, make the existing systems prone to various attacks (e.g. [10, 18, 22, 23] ). An honest user may have to suffer repeated misbehaviour (e.g., receiving infected files) without being able to identify the malicious perpetrator. Keeping users anonymous also conceals their trustworthiness, which in turn makes the information exchanged through system transactions untrustworthy as well. Consequently, a considerable amount of research has recently been focussing on the development of trust-and-reputation-based metrics aimed at enhancing the reliability of anonymity networks [7-9, 11, 31, 33] .
Developing an appropriate trust metric for anonymity is very challenging, due to the fact that trust and anonymity are seemingly conflicting notions. Consider for instance the trust networks of Figure 1 . In (a) peer A trusts B and D, who both trust C. Assume now that C wants to request a service from A anonymously, by proving her trustworthiness to A (i.e., the existence of a trust link to it). If C can prove that she is trusted by D without revealing her identity (using e.g. a zero-knowledge proof [3]), then A cannot distinguish whether the request originated from C or E. Yet, A's trust in D could be insufficient to obtain that specific service from A. Therefore, C could strengthen her request by proving that she is trusted by both D and B. This increases the trust guarantee. Unfortunately, it also decreases C's anonymity, as A can compute the intersection of peers trusted by both D and B, and therefore restrict the range of possible identities for the request's originator, or even identify C uniquely. Indeed, consider Figure 1(b) . Here the trust level between two principals is weighted, and trust between two non-adjacent principals is computed by multiplying the values over link sequences in the obvious way. Assume that the reliability constraint is that principal X can send (resp. receive) a message to (from) principal Y if and only if her trust in Y is not lower than 60%. Principal E can therefore only communicate through principal D. So, assuming that trust values are publicly known, E cannot possibly keep her identity from D as soon as she tries to interact at all. These examples document the existence of an inherent trade-off between anonymity and trust. The fundamental challenge is to achieve an appropriate balance between practical privacy, and acceptable network performance.
Community-based reputation systems are becoming increasingly popular both in the research literature and in practical applications. They are systems designed to estimate the trustworthiness of principals participating in some activity, as well as predict their future behaviour. Metrics for trustworthiness are primarily based on peer-review, where peers can rate each other according to the quality they experienced in their past mutual interactions [12, 13, 20] . A good reputation indicates a peer's good past behaviour, and is reflected in a high trust value. Recent research in this domain has raised fundamental issues in the design of reputation management systems for anonymous networks. In particular,
